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IN SEARCH OF THE LOST CHORD:
REFLECTIONS ON THE 1996
ITEM VETO ACT
Neal E. Devinst

For more than one hundred years, Presidents have clamored
for item veto authority. Contending-as Ronald Reagan did in his
1986 State of the Union-that "I'll take the responsibility, I'll
make the cuts, [and] I'll take the heat," Presidents have repeatedly
challenged Congress to "give [them] the authority to veto waste."'
Thanks to the 1994 Republican takeover of Congress, Bill Clinton
reaped an apparent windfall from the Contract with America, namely, the power to cancel (subject to congressional override) any
dollar amount of discretionary budget authority, any item of new
direct spending, and certain limited tax benefits.Z
On January 2, 1997, one day after the self-described "Line
Item Veto Act" became effective,3 a potent bipartisan coalition of
lawmakers and former executive and legislative branch officials

t Professor of Law and Lecturer in Government, College of William and Mary. This
essay is an outgrowth of comments made at the Symposium entitled Presidential Power in
the Twenty-First Century, Case Western Reserve School of Law (Apr. 4-5, 1997). Thanks
to program participants, especially Mike Fitts, Lou Fisher, and Larry Lessig, for sharing
their insights with me. Thanks also to Ken Greenspan for excellent research assistance.
I. 22 WKLY. COMP. PRES. Doc. 135, 136 (1986).
2. See Line Item Veto Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-130, 110 Stat. 1200 (1996).
The constitutionality of this legislation is now before the Supreme Court. See Joan
Biskupic, Justices Put Line-Item Veto on Fast Track for Review, WASH. POST, Apr. 24,
1997, at A23. The focus of this essay, however, is the likely operation of item veto
reforms. Since such reforms can be achieved through a constitutional amendment or better
crafted legislation, a decision striking down the 1996 Act will not kill the item veto. As
such, irrespective of what the Supreme Court says about the 1996 Act, the workability of
the item veto will remain an important policy question.
3. Despite its title, the Item Veto Act does not grant the President item veto authority. The President, rather than veto "items" in a bill of joint resolution, must sign or veto
the entire measure. After signing a bill or joint resolution, the President may exercise his
power-specified cancellation authority.
1605
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asked a court to strike the measure down because it "alter[s] the
constitutional balance of powers between the Legislative and Executive Branches."4 Supporters of the Act, while conceding that the
Congress is "taking action against [its institutional] interests,''5
describe this shift in budgetary power as salutary. In particular, as
bill sponsor John McCain (R-Ariz.) put it: "Given Congress' predilection for ... [veto-proof] omnibus spending bills, and continuing
resolutions, it would seem only prudent and constitutional to provide the President with functional veto power."& In other words,
contrary to opponents' claims, "The Congress is not transferring
power;" instead, "this bill does nothing more than" restore the
President's veto power.7
Conflicting characterizations of the item veto bill do share a
common ingredient, namely, that the act is momentous. For supporters, the bill promises to cut deficits and cures an imbalance of
power between Congress and the White House; for opponents, the
bill creates an imbalance of power. While legal challenges to the
Act may well then turn on the courts' assessment of these competing spins,8 the Act's impact on both the budget and the balance of
powers may be far less consequential than either supporters or
opponents let on. Political will and socio-political context, rather
than changes in the structural division of power, will likely prove
dominant in defming the balance of power between the Congress
and White House on budgetary policy.9 This was true before the
4. Complaint for Declaratory Relief at 5, Byrd v. Raines, Civil No. 97-000l(TPJ)
(D.D.C. Apr. 10, 1997). The lawmakers include Robert Byrd, Mark Hatfield, and Daniel
Patrick Moynihan. The government officials (who are the attorneys for these lawmakers)
include former Clinton White House Council Lloyd Cutter, one time Senate Legal Council
Mike Davidson, and ex-Reagan Assistant Attorney General Charles Cooper.
5. 142 CONG. REC. S2929, S2962 (1996) (remarks of Sen. Lott).
6. 141 CONG. REc. S53, S104 (1995).
7. ld. Some supporters, however, see the item veto as a broad delegation of legislative power to the president. As majority leader Trent Lott (R-Miss.) put it "This is a
fundamental change; there is no denying it." 142 CONG. REc. at S2962. For these supporters, the item veto restores fiscal discipline to the appropriations process by "allowing
the President to exercise leadership in controlling spending and to impose priorities." Id.
at S2960 (remarks of Sen. Gramm).
8. U.S. District Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson's April 10, 1997 decision striking
down the Line Item Veto Act concluded that Congress impermissibly "ceded basic legislative authority" by transferring to the President "the function of repealing a provision of
statutory law." Byrd v. Raines, Civil No. 97-0001(TPL), 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4397, at
*34 (D.D.C. Apr. 10, 1997). In reversing this decision, the Supreme Court expressed no
opinion on the Act's constitutionality. Instead, the Court ruled that congressional plaintiffs
lacked standing. See Raines v. Byrd, 117 S. Ct. 2312, 1997 U.S. Lexis 4040 (1997).
9. For a concise thoughtful explanation of why structural divisions of power do not
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Line Item Veto Act was approved and will likely remain true. Put
another way: Circumstances where the President is likely to make
moderate use of the item veto are situations where the President
would have successfully negotiated a budget compromise with
Congress; circumstances where the President is likely to make
aggressive use of the item veto are instances where the President
would have used his veto and other powers to navigate a budget
stalemate with Congress.
Along these lines, the very fact that Congress approved the
item veto suggests that Congress may well see this deficit cutting
mechanism as being more about symbolic politics than about a
fundamental shift in the balance of powers. For more than a decade, Congress has been looking for ways to appear responsive to
skyrocketing budget deficits without abandoning its taste for pork.
The item veto is a curious but sensible solution to this dilemma.
Indeed, irrespective of the Supreme Court's ultimate assessment of
the Line Item Veto Act's constitutionality,10 the line item veto
may well become a permanent fixture of budgetary policymaking.
While the Supreme Court can compel Congress to pursue budgetary reform through alternative means (including a constitutional
amendment), no Supreme Court decision can damper those political
forces that prompted Congress to approve the Line Item Veto Act.
Why is Congress committed to item veto legislation? After all,
the item veto allows the President to kill constituency-driven pork
barrel appropriations. In reality, however, the President will be
constrained in his exercise of the item veto for the very reason that
Congress cannot resist deficit spending, namely, interest groups and
voters alike want to protect, not eliminate, government largesse. No
doubt, the President will make use of the item veto, especially on
silly sounding projects that lack a politically potent constituency
(endive farming, the Lawrence Welk museum, private schools in

define the ultimate division of power among the branches, see Michael A. Fitts, The
Foibles of Formalism: Applying a Political "Transaction Cost" Analysis to Separation of
Powers, 41 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 1643 (1997).
10. Raines v. Byrd, while not commenting on the Act's constitutionality, suggested that
the Court would eventually decide this question. By referring to its "natural urge to proceed directly to the merits of this important dispute" and making clear that its decision
does not foreclose "constitutional challenge (by someone who suffers judicially cognizable
injury ... )," the Court indicated that Raines will not be its last word on the Item Veto
Act Raines, 1997 Lexis at *33, *17. Instead, once the President exercises his item veto
power, an individual adversely affected by the President's action undoubtedly will have
standing to file suit At that time, the Item Veto Act is likely to again make its way
onto the Supreme Court's docket
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foreign countries, etc.). More significantly, the item veto will sometimes be used to place the President's priorities ahead of
Congress'. Yet Congress has enough weapons in its arsenal to rein
in an overly aggressive White House. For example, Congress can
make use of many of the devices that state lawmakers now use to
blunt governors' item veto power. Moreover, by shifting responsibility to the President, Congress can approve constituency-driven
programs without having to take the heat for adding to the nation's
deficit. As a result, rather than make some hard budgetary decisions, Congress can take cover behind its White House delegee.
In the end, the item veto is likely to add more nuance than
substance to the elaborate stew of Congressional-White House power sharing. For the most part, the President's exercise of this authority will reflect the give and take between the branches that
would have existed with or without the item veto. In this way, the
item veto can be analogized to Japanese Kabuke theater:-"[A]
highly stylized process for displaying in a formal way the essence
of something which in real life takes place in other venues."11
This essay, while downplaying the item veto's likely significance, will not embrace the item veto. My contention, instead, is
that Congress and the White House would much prefer to operate
within existing parameters than to dramatically restructure the balance of powers in the name of budget reform. 12 Part I will serve
as a short course in President-Congress budgetary politics. This
discussion will reveal that the item veto, rather than restore presidential power, expands the President's power of the purse. Part II,
however, will cast doubt on the practical significance of this new
power. Not only is the item veto unlikely to result in substantial (if
any) deficit reduction, it is not likely to significantly alter the
balance of power between Congress and the White House. 13 In
addition to considering the likely operation of the item veto, this
discussion will also consider the dynamic between the Executive
and Congress on post-Chadha legislative vetoes and congressional
information access requests. Part III will serve as a synthesis of
11. E. Donald Elliot. Reinventing Rulemaldng, 41 DUKE LJ. 1490, 1492 (1992).
12. For an explication of why Congress and the White House almost always operate
within existing parameters, see Theodore J. Lowi, President v. Congress: What the TwoParty Duopoly Has Done to the American Separation of Powers, 47 CASE W. REs. L.
REV. 1219 (1997).
13. This conclusion is somewhat inconsistent with earlier writings of mine and testimony that I have presented to Congress. Those writings argue that the item veto, while
resulting in little or no deficit reduction, will significantly shift the balance of power.
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sorts. It will summarize the teachings, such as they are, of the first
two parts as well as consider why Congress and White House
resistance to a balanced budget amendment strengthens my central
claim about elected government's disinterest in transforming itself
in order to balance the budget. 14
I. THE BUDGET AND THE BALANCE OF POWERS

The Line Item Veto Act is, at least for now, the culminating
event in a twenty-five year struggle between the White House and
Congress. On one side of the divide, the Act is deemed a necessary response to Congress's vitiation of the President's veto and,
with it, the framers' belief that power should be shared among the
three branches in order to limit the intrusiveness of the Federal
Government. 15 On the other side, the Act is deemed a sell out of
Congress' power of the purse in favor of a return to the heretofore
discredited Nixon administration campaign to advance presidential
policy priorities through the impoundment of appropriated funds.
While it is tempting to say the truth lies somewhere between these
poles, it does not. The Item Veto Act embraces a vision of the
separation of powers at odds with the constitutional design.16
A. The Rise and Partial Decline of Congress'

Power of the Purse11

The power of the purse lies with Congress. The Constitution
prohibits money "drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of

14. Lany Lessig makes a similar argument in his provocative, often compelling contribution to this symposium. See Lawrence Lessig, Lessons From a Line Item Veto Law, 47
CASE W. REs. L. REv. 1659 (1997). Unlike Lany Lessig, however, I do not think that a
combined Balanced Budget/Item Veto Amendment will necessarily accomplish much. Unless and until elected government is willing to treat the national debt as a flrst order
priority, existing incentives to maintain expenditures without reducing taxes will remain.
For this reason, Balanced Budget Amendment proposals are typically filled with loopholes.
Beyond those built in escape hatches, as Mike Fitts ably demonstrates, structure, and with
it structural refonn, is overestimated. See Fitts, supra note 9.
15. Greg Sidak makes an analogous argument in support of the president's inherent
item veto power. See Line Item Veto: The President's Constitutional Authority, Hearing
before the Subcommittee on the Constitution of the Senate Judiciary Committee, 103rd
Cong., 1st Sess. 1074, 1088 (1993) (statement of J. Gregory Sidak).
16. In saying that the item veto is inconsistent with the constitutional balance of powers, I do not mean that the Act is unconstitutional.
17. Significant portions of the following section are borrowed from my prior work. See
Neal Devins, Budget Reform and the Balance of Powers, 31 WM. & MARY L. REv. 993,
998-1004 (1990); Neal Devins, A Symbolic Balanced Budget Amendment, 9 J. LAW &
POL. 61, 64-72 (1992).
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Appropriations made by Law."18 This power was placed outside of
the executive, for fear of the consequences of centralizing the
powers of purse and sword. As James Madison wrote in The Federalis.t No. 58: "This power of the purse may, in fact, be regarded
as the most complete and effectual weapon with which any constitution can arm the immediate representatives of the people." 19 As
characterized in the Senate's Iran-Contra Report: The appropriations
power is "the Constitution's most significant check on Executive
power."20
The framers' conclusion that the "legislative department alone
has access to the pockets of the people"21 does not mean that the
President is proscribed from playing a role in legislative decision
making on appropriations. Rather, the Constitution guarantees the
President a large role in legislative decision making, including
decision making on appropriations. In the f'rrst place, the President
may recommend to Congress measures that he considers "necessary
and expedient.'' More importantly, the President possesses a qualified veto over legislation that allows him to force Congress to pay
heed to his view of what is unnecessary or inexpedient. The framers regarded these separately enumerated powers as mutually supporting an ongoing legislative role for the President.
Nonetheless, the President's budgetary role is clearly subordinate to that of Congress. Congress determines funding levels and
establishes parameters for the expenditure of appropriated funds.
Although the power to recommend, and especially the power to
veto, enables the President to communicate vigorously his views to
Congress and to participate actively in the process, Congress makes
the ultimate decision whether and to what extent executive sentiments should prevail.
Through its control of budgetary decision making, Congress is
also empowered to create formal mechanisms of communication
between the executive and the legislature on budgetary matters.
Prior to 1921, the President had no statutory responsibilities for
submitting a budget.22 The President's formal role began with the

18. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
19. 1tiE FEDERALIST No. 58, at 300 (James Madison) (M. Beloff ed., 1987).
20. SENATE SELEcr COMM. ON SECRET MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO IRAN AND NICARA·
GUAN 0PPOSmON & HOUSE SELEcr COMM. TO INVESTIGATE COVERT ARMS TRANSACTIONS WITH IRAN, REPORT, S. REP. No. 216, H.R. REP. No. 433, tOOth Cong., 1st Sess.
18 (1987).
21. 1tiE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 254 (James Madison) (M. Beloff ed., 1987).
22. See Loms FISHER, PREsiDENTIAL SPENDING POWER 9-35 (1975) (discussing presi-
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Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 ("l921 Act"),23 which Congress enacted in response to the huge national debt accumulated
during World War I. The 1921 Act required the President to construct and submit an annual budget, but allowed Congress complete
freedom to alter the budget. Congress was expected to coordinate
its revenue and spending decisions with the President's budgetary
recommendations. The President was supposed to be responsible for
overall budget aggregates, with Congress retaining the right to set
priorities within those aggregates.
Although the 1921 Act accorded greater budgetary responsibility to the President, it did not alter the fundamental balance of
power between Congress and the President.24 The President's responsibility to establish budget aggregates was more than tempered
by Congress' power to increase or decrease the President's budget
by a simple majority vote. The 1921 Act thus respected two essential constitutional principles: the President's responsibility for his
own proposals and Congress' ultimate responsibility for appropriations, subject only to the President's veto. Under the 1921 Act,
Congress did not surrender or dilute its fiscal prerogatives, nor
invade any executive prerogatives. In fact, the 1921 Act did not
subordinate either branch to the other but carefully preserved their
respective roles.
Congress sought again to protect its budgetary prerogatives
and preserve the balance of power between the executive and itself
when it enacted the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974.25 Congress passed the Budget Act in response to
the impoundment controversy of the early 1970s in which President
Nixon claimed that the executive could refuse to spend appropriated funds if he judged such refusal to be in the national interest.
Presidential impoundments threatened the budgetary balance of

dential duties in budget matters prior to the 1921 Budget and Accounting Act).
23. Ch. 18, 42 Stat. 20 (1921).
24. As stated in the House Report:
It will doubtless be claimed by some that this is an Executive budget and that
the duty of making appropriations is a legislative rather than Executive prerogative. The plan outlined does provide for an Executive initiation of the budget,
but the President's responsibility ends when he has prepared the budget and
transmitted it to Congress.
H. R. REP. No. 14, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7 (1921).
25. Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88 Stat 297 (1974) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of I, 2 & 31 U.S.C.).
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power. By withholding appropriations, the President could control
aggregates and priorities.
The Budget Act contained a number of provisions designed to
strengthen congressional control over fiscal affairs. Under the Budget Act, presidential rescissions of appropriated funds required both
Senate and House approval.26 The Budget Act also created Budget
Committees in the House and Senate,27 established a Congressional Budget Office to supply technical support,28 and required the
adoption of budget resolutions to set overall limits on budget aggregates (such as total outlays and revenues) and permit debate on
spending priorities.29 In formulating its budget resolutions since
1974, Congress has often applied economic, technical and policy
assumptions different from those presented in the executive budget.3o
The 1974 Act then enabled Congress to defend itself against
the so-called "imperial presidency.'m In particular, the Nixon administration had launched a concerted effort to extend White House
authority through both governmental reorganization and claims of
inherent presidential authority. Along with its claim of impoundment authority, for example, the Nixon White House centralized
presidential control over the administrative state through its establishment, in 1970, of the Office of Management and Budget.32
Fearing these and other initiatives, Congress fought back through
the 1974 Budget Act, the War Powers Resolution, and its use of
the legislative veto to · condition its delegations of policymaking
authority.33
·

26. See §§ 1012, 1017, 88 Stat. at 333-34, 337-39. The President could defer the
spending of funds, subject to a one-house veto. See id. § 1013, 88 Stat at 334-35. The
Supreme Court struck down one-house legislative vetoes in INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919
(1983).
27. See §§ 101-102, 88 Stat at 299-302.
28. See id. §§ 201-203, 88 Stat. at 302-05.
29. See id. §§ 302, 305, 88 Stat. at 306-08, 310-12. Through the use of a congressional budget adopted in concurrent resolutions, Congress sets "macro" policy and allocates
the outlays and budget authority among a number of broad categories, such as national
defense, health, and agriculture. Congress is still supposed to fonnulate and fund specific
programs through regular appropriation bills, but within the broad outlines of the budget
resolution. See A. ScmCK, LEGISLATION, APPROPRIATIONS, AND BUDGETS: THE DEVELOPMENT OF SPENDING DECISION-MAKING IN CONGRESS 41-43 (Cong. Res. Serv. 1984).
30. See A. SCHICK, R. KEITH & E. DAVID, MANUAL ON TilE FEDERAL BUDGET PRoCESS 5 (Cong. Res. Serv. 1984).
31. See A. SCHLESINGER, THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY (1973).
32. See FISHER, supra note 22, at 46-58.
33. For case study treatments of the legislative veto and War Powers Resolution, see
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The 1974 Budget Act's recalibration of the balance of powers
came at a price, however. Specifically, the principal consequence of
this transformation was fiscal irresponsibility. The Budget Act
hinged on a centralized process, the budget resolution. Yet Congress, unlike the quintessentially centralized Executive, is strongly
decentralized.34 Whereas the Office of Management and Budget
("OMB") must answer to the President, and serves as the White
House's authoritative voice on budget matters, the Congressional
Budget Office ("CBO") has less institutional clout because it is not
answerable to any of the 535 members for which it speaks. These
institutional differences have contributed to the budget deficit in
two quite distinct ways. First, by devaluing the President's budgetary role, Congress and the White House both pay more attention to
program priorities than budget aggregates. Consequently, anticipated
revenues have been overestimated in order to make way for greater
spending. Congress accomplished this mischief by voting a generous ceiling in the budget resolution, while the President simply
manipulated his aggregates to accommodate policy preferences.35
Second, by centralizing its budgetary decision making through both
the budget resolution and increased reliance on omnibus appropriations housed in a single continuing resolution (rather than thirteen
separate appropriations bills), Congress became vulnerable to centralized but ill-conceived budget planning.36
Witness the exponential growth of budget deficits since 1981.
Prior to 1981, the accumulated national debt stood at roughly one
trillion dollars. Although over-optimistic budget projections made
deficits common (occurring in all but five years since 1950), deficit
spending averaged only 5.1 percent of total outlays from 19501980.37 That all changed in 1981. Riding the wake of Ronald

LoUIS FISHER AND NEAL DEVINS, POUTICAL DYNAMICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 120134, 151-172 (2d ed. 1996).
34. An explication of how Congress' decentralized structure creates collective action
problems that adversely affect fiscal policymaking can be found in Michael Fitts & Robert
Inman, Controlling Congress: Presidential Influence in Domestic Fiscal Policy, 80 GEO.
LJ. 1737 (1992).
35. See LOUIS FISHER, THE POLmCS OF SHARED POWER: CONGRESS AND THE EXECUTIVE 192 (3d ed. 1993).
36. See Rudolph Penner, An Appraisal of the Congressional Budget Process, in THE
BUDGET PROCESS: EXERCISING POLmCAL CHOICE 67 (Allen Schick ed., 1986); Allen
Schick, How The Budget Was Won and Lost, in PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS: ASSESSING
REAGAN'S FIRST YEAR 26-27 (Nonnan Ornstein ed., 1985).
37. See Paul Peterson, The New Politics of Deficits, in THE NEW DIRECTION IN AMERICAN PoLmcs 367 (John E. Chubb & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1985).
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Reagan's dramatic 1980 election victory, the Reagan administration
successfully pushed through Congress a new vision of economic
growth-supply side economics. Believing that a tax cut would
spur more than enough economic growth to offset lost revenues,
Congress slashed taxes by an estimated $150 billion annually,
while reducing expenditures by less than $50 billion.38 Things did
not work out as planned. Supply side economics could not tum
around restrictive Federal Reserve Board action and a sluggish
economy.39 As a result, the Reagan administration deficit estimate
was off by over $100 billion.40
The 1981 deficit debacle reveals the failings of the 1974 Act
structure. With neither branch taking the heat for unrealistic budget
aggregates, the likelihood of widely supported social policy objectives (such as increasing programmatic expenditures or decreasing
taxes) controlling aggregate figures was greatly increased.41 Furthermore, the unrealistic economic assumptions utilized in 1981 set
in motion subsequent deficits. By 1985, budget deficits were so
outrageous that Congress felt compelled to act. Its solution was the
peculiar Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Deficit Control Act. GrammRudman represents something of a hybrid. In enacting the bill,
Congress proved it was no longer willing to trust either its own
internal budgetary process or the President's.42 Consequently, an
automatic sequestration procedure ensures that the budget conforms
to deficit reduction targets. Specifically, if the regular appropriations process does not produce a budget within Gramm-Rudman's
prescribed deficit reduction target,43 the OMB prepares a sequestration order to be issued shortly after the start of the fiscal

38. See id. at 382 (citing 37 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 93,259 (1981)).
39. See id. at 382-84.
40. See id. at 384-85.
41. Indeed, while 1981 was a watershed, a comparison of the five years before and
the five years after the 1974 Act reveals that the annual deficit had already quadrupled.
See JOHN CRAWFORD, BALANCED BUDGET AMENDMENT SUDDENLY COMES TO LIFE, re·
printed in 50 CONG. Q. WKLY. RPr. 1234-35 (1992) (National Taxpayers Union Chart).
See also Louis Fisher, Federal Budget Doldrums: The Vacuum in Presidential Leadership,
50 PuB. ADMIN. REV. 693, 697 (1990).
42. See Jack Brooks, Gramm-Rudman: Can Congress and the President Pass This
Buck?, 64 TEx. L. REv. 131, 131 (1985) (labeling Gramm-Rudman "a wholesale abdication of constitutional responsibility").
43. Under Gramm-Rudman, the calculation of the maximum expenditure level within
the deficit reduction target is made by the OMB. See The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-177, 99 Stat. 1038 (1985) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.).
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year.44 In order to limit executive control, Congress specified
mandatory formulae for allocating the spending cuts. 45 The executive, therefore, could not use the sequestration order as an opportunity to control budget priorities. As Senator Phil Gramm (R-Tex)
explained:
Let me make note of . . . why this is significantly different
than impoundment, and why it is significantly different
than any line-item veto approach. We all know that the
difficulties in those procedures is that Members of Congress are jealous of their powers, and they do not want to
transfer power to the executive branch. . . . This bill does
not create new powers.46
Although Gramm-Rudman did not alter the fundamental budgetary balance of power, Congress' utilization of automatic mechanisms and reliance on entities outside its control paved the way for
the further abdication of budgetary responsibility. As former Congressman Jack Brooks (D-Tex) wrote in his lament of GrammRudman: "Active efforts to cure a problem may be controversial
and are seldom risk-free. It is tempting to believe that avoiding
blame is a safer course."47 He added, "Gramm-Rudman demonstrates once again that political accountability is an extremely difficult problem for the American system of government."48
Gramm-Rudman, in fact, exacerbated the failings of the 1974
Act. Rather than compelling realism, the Act spawned budget gimmickry. As former CBO head Rudolph Penner noted: "GrammRudman produced forecasts that promised to achieve deficit goals
when there was little hope of coming close to them. It promoted
dishonest accounting that seemed to make the deficit lower than it
really was."49 Gramm-Rudman also contributed to the rise of om-

44. See Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Reaffirmation Act of 1987,
Pub. L. No. 100-119, § 102(b)(l), 101 Stat. 754, 767 (1987) (codified as amended at 2
u.s.c. § 902(b)(l) (1989)).
45. For a description of this process, see Kate Stith, Rewriting the Fiscal Constitution:
The Case of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, 16 CAL. L. REv. 593, 630-33 (1988).
46. 131 CONG. REc. 25,840 (1985) (statement of Sen. Phil Gramm).
47. Brooks, supra note 42, at 135.
48. /d. at 137.
49. Rudolph Penner, No Will, No Way, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 1992, at A23. Examples
of this include shifting costs away from the present year to an earlier year and raising
revenue in the current year at the expense of future revenue. See id. Another tactic was
for the OMB to limit program cuts by grossly overestimating revenues. See Jackie
Calmes, Despite Tough Talk, Big Cuts Unlikely, 48 CONG. Q. WKLY. RPT. 218, 218-19
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nibus spending bills housed in continuing resolutions. Appropriations subcommittees, fearing that their budgets would be cut a
second time to make up for those subcommittees that failed to
meet their deficit-reduction goals, refused to bring their bills forward.50 As a result, Gramm-Rudman created disincentives for the
making of hard budgetary choices. Moreover, by encouraging last
minute action, Gramm-Rudman shifted control away from decentralized appropriation subcommittees to the more centralized Appropriations Committee, which hammered out the entire budget in the
form of a continuing resolution.
Unrealistic budget projections and centralized budgeting are the
hallmarks of Gramm-Rudman. This outcome should come as no
surprise. From 1986-1991 (when deficit targets were in place), the
nation's deficit rose $1.2 trillion.51 During this period, the actual
deficit exceeded deficit reduction targets by more than $400 billion.52
Gramm-Rudman is revealing for other reasons. Notwithstanding
the high political stakes of reining in a runaway deficit, Congress'
crafting of the original Gramm-Rudman statute seemed, at best,
haphazard. The Senate held no hearings and House hearings were
little more than a formality, with only four persons invited to testify.53 Moreover, rather than seriously consider warnings that the
Act was unconstitutional, Congress included within the statute a
procedure that would guarantee expedited review by the Supreme
Court.54 This pass-the-buck mentality underscores the source of
much of our deficit woes-Congress' unwillingness to hold itself
accountable for the responsible exercise of its "power of the
purse."55
(1990). Former Senate Budget Committee Chair Jim Sasser (D-Tenn), expressing frustration at this subterfuge, complained that "we have ended up with two sets of books. • . .
First, we keep a set for the Gramm-Rudman game-and this is a useful fiction manipulated to give the illusion of progress-and second, we keep a set of books that are the real
books. This is the real deficit." Budget Reform Proposals, Joint Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs and the Senate Comm. on the Budget, lOlst Cong.,
1st Sess. 2 (1989).
50. Congressman David Obey, then an appropriations subcommittee chair, castigated the
Gramm-Rudman model for creating "an incentive for every committee around here not to
bring their bill out to floor." 134 CONG. REc. H66, H69 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 1988).
51. See ROBERT KEITH & EDWARD DAVIS, CONG. REsEARCH SERVICE, A BALANCED
FEDERAL BUDGET: MAJOR STATUTORY PROVISIONS 3 (1992).
52. See id.
53. See FlSHER & DEVINS, supra note 33, at 135.
54. See id. at 135-36.
55. In particular, rather than bear the decisional costs for tough budgetary choices,
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The failure of Gramm-Rudman prompted further reforms in
1990. The Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 substituted heretofore
impossible-to-meet deficit-reduction goals with spending guidelines.56 These guidelines, by placing separate upper limits on defense, domestic, and international spending, were intended to keep
expenditures stable. The problem is that the deficit once again
exploded. The combination of a costly savings and loan bailout and
a persistent recession that limited revenues resulted in a deficit
estimated at more than $350 billion for fiscal year 1992, the Act's
first year in operation.57 By ignoring the problems of revenues
altogether, the Budget Enforcement Agreement accomplished little
other than to provide the cover of "a supposedly statutory mandate., to the Congress and White House.58
Fiscal year 1993 brought more of the same. Agreeing to an
extension of the 1990 agreement, President Clinton and Congress
congratulated each other for responding to the deficit crisis without
making the hard choices necessary to eat into the ever-ballooning
deficit. At the end of 1996, the public debt had grown an additional $1 trillion and stood at $5.3 trillion dollars. This figure is truly
frightening. When Ronald Reagan became President, the debt stood
at $1 trillion. Since that time, it has grown at a rate of $1 trillion
every four years ($3 trillion in 1989; $4 trillion in 1993; $5.3
trillion in 1997).59 In other words, Congress and the White
House's posturing as well as the enactment of several budget reform measures seem somewhat beside the point. Moreover, with
annual interest on the national debt now standing at roughly $1
trillion, there is reason to think that a dramatic restructuring of the
current arrangement is in order. For that reason, the Item Veto Act
is especially important.
Unlike earlier reform efforts, the item veto bill appears to be a
license to kill.60 Specifically, whenever the President signs an appropriations bill, he may (within five calendar days after enact-

Congress sought to hide behind Gramm-Rudmann's mandator:y formulas.
56. See George Hager, New Rules to Old Game, 49 CONG. Q. WKLY. RPT. 336
(1991).
57. See George Hager, Is the Deficit Now Too Big for Congress to Tame?, 50 CONG.
Q. WKLY. RPT. 1140 (1992).
58. LoutS FISHER, CONSTITliTIONAL CONFLICfS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT 211 {4th ed. 1997).
59. See id.
60. Congress, however, can end run many of the bill's specifications. See infra notes
106-12 and accompanying tex.L
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ment) cancel dollar amounts identified in the bill as well as any
dollar amount revealed in any table, chart, or explanatory text
contained in a committee report or statement of the appropriation
bill's managers.61 Once the President exercises this cancellation
authority, Congress has thirty days to pass a bill disapproving of
the President's cancellations.62 Any "disapproval bill" Congress
passes is then subject to constitutionally specified presidential veto
and congressional override procedures.63 Hence, unless two-thirds
of both houses of Congress disapprove of the President's actions,
the President appears (legally) unrestrained in his ability to rescind
discretionary appropriations.
The Line Item Veto Act appears, in critical respects, to be a
sea change in presidential spending power. No longer is the President dependent on Congress; instead, cancellations take effect
whenever one-third (plus one) of either house of Congress sides
with the President. Nevertheless, some Act supporters cast the item
veto as little more than a "restor[ation] [of] the constitutional system of checks and balances."64 This characterization, as the next
part will demonstrate, is incorrect. Rather than protect inherent
presidential power from a Congress bent on "eliminating the
President's veto authority,"65 cancellation authority is a truly new
power that threatens to misalign the balance of powers.66
B. The Veto Power
Line item veto proponents argue that the item veto restores
essential presidential power. This claim has two components. First,

61. Presidential cancellation power also extends to entitlement authority, food stamps,
and limited tax benefits.
62. Congress may strike from the disapproval bill any canceled item that no longer
commands majority support.
63. In this way, the Act avoids Chadha-like bicameralism and presentment problems.
Specifically, whenever Congress acts, legislation is approved by both Houses and presented to the President for his signature or veto. In his opinion invalidating the Item Veto
Act, however, Judge Jackson argued that, under Chadha, "there are formal aspects of the
legislative process that Congress may not alter." 142 CONG. REc. S2929, S2999 (1996).
For Jackson, the Act's broad delegation of legislative power is inconsistent with Chadha's
command that legislative power resides with the Congress. For further discussion, see
infra note 99 and accompanying text.
64. 141 CoNG. REc. H1143 (1995) (comments of Rep. Cox). Other Act supporters see
the item veto as a very broad delegation of power necessitated by Congress' fiscal irresponsibility. See infra note 90 and accompanying text.
65. 141 CONG. REc. H1143 (1995) (comments of Rep. Cox).
66. For an explication of why such a misalignment is unlikely to happen, see infra
notes 135-48 and accompanying text.
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speaking of the 1974 Budget Act as a fundamental shift in power
that "deprived the President" of his "right" to impound funds, Act
supporters depict the item veto as little more than a return to the
status quo ante.67 Second, contending that "[t]he modern congressional practice of presenting the President with omnibus legislation
reduces the President's ability to play the role in enacting laws that
the Constitution intended," item veto authority has been heralded as
a "practical and principled" way to resurrect the veto power.68
Neither of these claims can withstand scrutiny. The veto power
has always been limited to bills, not bill provisions. Along these
lines, Nixon administration efforts to substitute impoundments for
vetoes were an aggrandizement of presidential power, not the defensive exercise of preexisting power. Claims that omnibus bills
unconstitutionally aggrandize legislative power are also unpersuasive. The Constitution places no single subject limitations on Congress. Moreover, the rise of omnibus legislation has not undermined the presidential veto. An energetic President, through the
threatened use of his veto power, may take advantage of high
stakes omnibus legislation to enhance his bargaining position.69
Omnibus Legislation and the Constitution. Article I, Section 7
simply provides that every bill "shall have passed the House of
Representatives and the Senate" and shall be "presented to the
President" before it becomes law.70 This process requirement neither limits the scope nor sweep of legislation. As such, it is preposterous to suggest that omnibus legislation runs afoul of this
requirement. In fact, "we have had omnibus bills from the start,"
including the frrst three appropriation bills passed by Congress.71
The question remains whether the Constitution empowers the
President with inherent item veto or impoundment authority to fend
off Congress' bundling of disparate items into an omnibus bill.
Although the Constitution does not explicitly repudiate such presidential authority,72 nowhere in the Constitution can there be found
67.
68.
PREs.
69.

141 CoNG. REc. S4153 (1995) (statement of Sen. McCain).
Statement of President William J. Clinton Upon Signing S. 4, 32 WKLY. COMP.
Docs. 637 (1996).
For a thoughtful treatment on what it means to be an energetic president, see

TERRY EAsTLAND, ENERGY IN TIIE ExECUTIVE: THE CASE FOR A STRONG PRESIDENCY

(1992).
70. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl.2.
71. Line Item Veto: Hearings on S. 43 Before the Senate Comm. on Rules and Admin-

istration, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 192 (1985) (statement of Louis Fisher); see also Note, Is
A Presidential Item Veto Constitutional?, 96 YALE LJ. 838, 840-43 (1987).
72. Greg Sidak and Thomas Smith make much of this fact in their quasi·defense of
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inherent item veto or impoundment authority. In particular, inherent
item veto and impoundment authority seem at odds with the
Constitution's designation of Congress as the lawmaking branch of
government. Since neither house of Congress can insist on its
preferred version of legislation without the others' consent, inherent
item veto or impoundment authority would effectively give the
President more power in the legislative process than the Congress.
Specifically, since it would require two-thirds of both houses of
Congress to overtake either a line item veto or impoundment/3
the President could adjust legislation to suit his preferences without
the assent of Congress. In other words, inherent line item veto or
impoundment authority makes a mockery of the Framers' decision
to limit the President's legislative role vis-a-vis Congress by favoring a qualified veto over an absolute veto.74
Claims that the decision to spend or withhold appropriated
funds are part and parcel of the President's duty to "faithfully
execute" the law also fall short. This common sense conclusion,
shared by "[v]irtually all commentators," is best expressed in a
1988 Office of Legal Counsel ("OLC") opinion.75 Observing that
"to give the president the authority to impound funds in order to
protect the national fisc, creates the anomalous result that the President would be declining to execute the laws under the claim of
faithfully executing them,"76 the OLC rejected claims of inherent
impoundment authority notwithstanding Reagan administration
efforts to expand the President's role in budgetary policy.77

inherent presidential item veto authority. See J. Gregory Sidak & Thomas A. Smith, Four
Faces of the Item Veto: A Reply to Tribe and Kurland, 84 Nw. L. REv. 437 (1990).
73. Item vetoes would be subject to Congress' traditional two-thirds override. Impoundments could only be nullified if Congress reenacts the appropriation and then overrides a
near certain presidential veto. For further discussion of impoundment overrides, see supra
notes 61-63 and accompanying text (describing Item Veto Act override procedures).
74. See Michael Rappaport, The President's Veto and the Constitution, 87 Nw. L. REV.
735 (1993) (demonstrating that the Framers were aware of and rejected inherent item veto
authority).
75. See 12 OP. OFF. LEGAL COUNSEL 159, 207 (Prelim. Print 1988).
76. Id. at 207-208.
77. Doug Kmiec, a former head of the OLC, took issue with this opinion's related
conclusion that the President is without inherent item veto authority. Perceiving that the
OLC should serve the President's political agenda through expansive interpretations of
executive power, Kmiec criticized members of the OLC for trading off the President's
interests for their personal interests in maintaining their reputation as neutral constitutional
analysts. See Douglas W. Kmiec, OLC's Opinion Writing Function, 15 CARDOZO L. REV.
337, 353-59 (1993).
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Omnibus Legislation and Veto Politics. "From the nature of the
Constitution," as George Washington put it, Presidents "must approve all parts of a bill or reject it in toto."78 With that said, Item
Veto Act supporters argue that Congress' practice of bundling
disparate items into a single "bill," even if technically constitutional, distorts the balance of powers by making it too difficult for the
President to exercise his veto.79 Accordingly, presidential item
veto and impoundment authority are trumpeted as a "restor[ation]
[of] what the founders saw as the strongest deterrent to wasteful
spending by Congress, an energetic executive with the power to
force a thoughtful and thorough debate on individual. items of
spending."80 I fmd this argument shortsighted. Omnibus legislation
has not proven the downfall of either the presidency or the veto
power.
President Reagan, for example, was well served by the 1981
Omnibus Reconciliation Act. According to Louis Fisher, "The
omnibus nature of the bill was championed by the White House
and presidential supporters as the only way to make cuts in popular programs."81 Reagan-era omnibus continuing resolutions, moreover, did not undermine the veto power. Although omnibus legislation changes the nature of the exchange between the White House
and Congress, the veto still functions as a mediating device. For
example, in 1982, President Reagan vetoed two orrmibus measures
and weathered a shutdown of parts of the federal government.82
As a result, Congress was forced to rework these bills to satisfy
presidential needs.83 More significantly, in 1987 the White House
and Congress undertook extensive negotiations to ensure that a
fiscal year 1988 continuing resolution was satisfactory· to both
78. Quoted in CHARLES J. ZINN, THE VETO POWER OF THE PREsiDENT 22 (1951).
79. See, e.g., 141 CONG. REc. H1078, H1099 (1995) (remarks of Rep. Rohrabacher);
id. at H1102 (remarks of Rep. Torkildnse); id. at H1143 (remarks of Rep. Fox).
80. ld. at H1100 (remarks of Rep. Cox). Along these lines, an argument can be made

that those "concerned with the task of preserving initial constitutional commitments in
light of changes in the constitutional context" might support item veto authority. See
Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM.
L. REV. I, 93 (1994). For reasons discussed in the balance of this section, however, I
think that supporters of "translational" approaches to constitutional interpretation should
reject claims of inherent item veto and impoundment authority.
81. Louis Fisher, Continuing Resolutions: Can't Live With 'em, Can't Live Without
'em, 48 PuB. BUDGEfiNG & FIN. 101, 103 (1988).
82. William Chapman, Congress Leaves for Holiday With Money Tangle Unsolved,
WASH. POST, July 2, 1982, at AI.
83. See, e.g., Sandra Evans Teeley, GOP Floats $1 Billion Housing Plan, WASH. POST,
July 22, 1982, at 01, col. 1.
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sides. In the end, Congress abandoned the fairness doctrine and
included Contra aid to stave off a threatened veto.84 If anything,
such legislative compromise reveal that a President who is willing
to use his veto wields enormous power in such negotiations. The
vitality of the veto power therefore cannot be measured by its
exercise. Rather, the effectiveness of the veto power must be measured by its impact on the political process. The "all or nothing"
stakes of omnibus legislation enabled President Reagan to enhance
his veto power through its threatened exercise.
As a matter of simple mathematics, frequency of use is also a
poor measure of the veto power's impact. Prior to the present era
of omnibus legislation, Presidents infrequently used their veto power.85 Washington vetoed only two bills. Seven Presidents never
used the power. Two Presidents, Franklin Roosevelt and Grover
Cleveland, account for roughly half of all vetoes. In short, although
Presidents may underutilize the veto power, the advent of omnibus
legislation is not the cause of its infrequent use.
The vitality of the veto power is today and has always been a
function of presidential energy. Witness, for example, George
Bush's extraordinarily effective and aggressive use of the veto
power.86 On forty-three occasions, Bush vetoed public bills. More
striking, a predominantly Democratic Congress was able to override
only one of these vetoes. As a result, Bush won important concessions from civil rights interests in the omnibus 1991 Civil Rights
Act and preserved anti-abortion language in appropriations bills.87
Furthermore, Bill Clinton's willingness to veto several appropriations bills and shut the government down rather than approve a

84. See Jackie Calmes, Reagan Wins Concessions in Final Funding Bill, 45 CONG. Q.
WKLY. REP. 3185, 3186 (1987). The President also used his veto threat to preserve funds
for anti-abortion counseling and for foreign assistance. See id.
85. See Calvin Bellamy, Item Veto: Shield Against Deficits or Weapon of Presidential
Power?, 22 VAL. U. L. REv. 557, 574-75 (1988).
86. See Janet Hook, President's Mastery of Veto Perplexes Hill Democrats, 49 CONG.
Q. WKLY. RPT. 2041 (1991).
87. On the 1991 Civil Rights Act, see Neal Devins, Reagan Redux: Civil Rights Under
Bush, 68 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 955, 982-999 (1993). On Bush's abortion vetoes, see
NEAL DEVINS, SHAPING CONSTITUTIONAL VALUES 102-104 (1996). In addition to these
vetoes, Bush also made effective use of veto threats. For example, he threatened to veto
the fiscal year 1990 budget bill and consequently let the Gramm-Rudman sequestration
take effect in order to further both his budget priorities and his bargaining position with
Congress. See Jodie Allen, How the Administration is Beating Congress in the Budget
Game, WASH. POST, Nov. 8, 1989, at B3.
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significant tax cut enhanced his bargaining position with Congress
as well as his reelection prospects.88
The Line Item Veto Act expands, rather than restores, essential
presidential prerogatives in the budget process. Neither the rise of
omnibus legislation nor the design of the Constitution supports
presidential item veto or impoundment authority as a mechanism to
preserve the President's role in the balance of powers. The veto
power remains vital in this era of omnibus legislation. Its potency
seems more a function of presidential energy than Congress' manipulation of the legislative process. Furthermore (and far more
significant), outside of the power to veto legislation, the Constitution does not specify any budgetary role for the President. In fact,
prior to 1921, the President had no formal budgetary responsibilities. Starting with the Budget Act of 1921, Congress shared some
of its budgetary power with the President. Yet, until its approval of
the Line Item Veto Act, Congress never ceded its power to set
budgetary priorities to the White House.89 For this reason, critics
of the Act sound an apocalyptic warning. Depicting the measure as
"a truly fundamental change to our system of government" which
will "take the appropriation process out of . . . [Congress and]
transport it down to 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue," Act opponents
warn, "This is the Constitution. This is not the so-called Contract
with America. This is the Constitution.•.w Section IT will serve as
a partial assessment of this claim.
IT. POLffiCAL WILL AND THE BALANCE OF POWERS:
TOWARDS AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE
LINE ITEM VETO ACT

Changes in the structural division of power, while hardly irrelevant, are but one ingredient that defmes budgetary policy. Consider
the Line Item Veto Act: Were structural divisions determinative,
the Act would place presidential budget priorities ahead of

88. See Dan Balz, Debates Offer Dole Opportunity to Reshape Struggling Campaign,
WASH. POST, Oct. 6, 1996, at AI. Clinton, however, did approve a modest tax cut and

agreed to Republican imposed spending cuts on several federal programs. See Ann
Devroy, Bill Signed to Fully Reopen Government, WASH. POST, Jan. 7, 1996, at AI.
89. Congress, however, has occasionally granted the President substantial power to set
budget priorities. In the late 1960s, for example, the President was allowed to adjust
spending ceilings. See Lams FISHER, THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS 106-110 (1971).
90. 141 CONG. REc. S4313, S4315 (1995) (remarks of Sen. Lautenberg); 141 CONG.
REc. Hl028, H1090 (1995) (remarks of Rep. Kajorski); 141 CONG. REc. S4222, S4227
(1995) (remarks of Sen. Byrd).
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Congress' and severely limit one of the most potent weapons in
Congress' legislative arsenal. As such, Congress' approval of the
item veto would seem bizarre, a self-inflicted wound on a grand
scale. In some measure, congressional debates on the Item Veto
Act embrace this "structure is everything" vision. Act opponents,
not surprisingly, depicted Congress' vote on the measure as a modem day Armageddon.91 What is surprising is that, in some measure, Act proponents agree with this characterization. Deeming the
Act "a major, major change in the policy of the Congress toward
the executive branch," some proponents claim that Congress must
sever its own powers in order to extricate a cancer (Congress'
fiscal irresponsibility) which "threatens to destroy the future well
being of our great nation."92
The truth, however, is that the Line Item Veto Act is not nearly as epic as its defenders and critics suggest. Although the Act
transfers legislative power to the President, Congress can easily
blunt this power by specifying appropriations priorities through
unofficial and informal documents, by bundling disparate programs
into a single item, and by rmancing programs indirectly through
nonappropriation bills.93 Congress, moreover, may rein in the President though its lawmaking, oversight, and confirmation powers.
Furthermore, with much of the budget outside the reach of the
Line Item Veto Act (either because the appropriation is mandatory
or the spending program politically popular), the President will be
constrained in his exercise of the item veto.
None of this is to suggest that the item veto is a nullity.94 At
the margins, it will enhance the President's position in budgetary

91. See id. and accompanying text; see also 141 CONG. REc. S2929, S2980 (1996)
(remarks of Sen. Reid) (describing the Act as being about "abrogating constitutional responsibility. It is about ceding unbridled spending authority to one individual in one
branch of the government"); id. at S2985 (remarks of Sen. Johnston) ("Why this Congress, this Senate would want to give up its constitutional powers • . . why we would
want to do that, I do not know.''); id. at H3000 ("[O]ne day there will be a Ph. D. writing a thesis about . . . how we gave up our power, how we gave up the balance of
powers that exists in our democracy.'').
92. 142 CONG. REC. at S2955 (remarks of Sen. Stevens). Other proponents characterize
the Act as a restoration of presidential power, not a delegation of legislative power. See
supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text
93. See LoUIS FISHER, STATE TECHNIQUES TO BLUNr THE GOVERNOR'S ITEM-VETO
POWER, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS (Dec. 12, 1996).
94. It is to suggest, however, that claims that the Item Veto Act unconstitutionally
disrupts the balance of powers are over-blown. Unless and until the President makes aggressive partisan use of cancellation authority, courts should reject "balance of powers"
challenges to the Act's constitutionality.
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battles with Congress. In particular, Congress must have the political will necessary to fend off presidential encroachments. Yet, just
as an energetic President can make effective use of his veto power
in this era of omnibus legislation,95 Congress too can retain its
power of the purse. In the end, the reach of the item veto is as
much a by-product of political will as it is of structural divisions
of authority.96 The truth of this proposition is the subject of this
section.
A. The Item Veto and Congress
Congress had good reason to pass the Line Item Veto Act. The
anti-incumbency sentiment that contributed to the 1994 Republican
takeover of Congress made it impossible for Congress to ignore
charges that its fiscal irresponsibility (or as Ross Perot put it
"waste, fraud, and abuse") jeopardized our nation's economic wellbeing. Moreover, with the failure of Gramm-Rudmann and post1990 budget summits to check the national debt,97 Congress needed either to rely on traditional mechanisms (increase taxes, reduce
spending) or fmd a new structural gimmick/approach. Traditional
mechanisms, however, remained unappealing. Tax increases have
no political constituency.98 At the same time, Congress could not
resist constituency-driven appropriations.99 Interest groups and voters alike expect their representatives to deliver "private goods" in
exchange for their support. 100 In other words, the very reasons
our national debt has grown so large explain why Congress cannot
take bold, decisive action to "balance the budget."

95. See supra notes 70-85 and accompanying text.
96. See infra notes 98-109 and accompanying text. For an analogous argument, see
Neal Devins, Political Will and the Unitary Executive: What Makes an Independent Agency lndependem?, 15 CARDOzo L. REV. 272 (1993) (assessing how congressional grants of
litigating authority to independent agencies affect White House control over independent
agency operations).
97. See supra notes 41-59 and accompanying text.
98. In a recent survey, 75% answered "no" when asked whether "[t]he government
should raise taxes now as one means of dealing with the federal budget." Who are the
Democrats?, WASH. POST, July 12, 1992, at A12.
99. A March 1997 Washington Post Survey underscores this conclusion. In it, 77% of
respondents opposed reductions in future spending on Social Security and Medicare in
order to balance the federal budget. See Eric Pianin & Mario Brossard, Americans Oppose
Cutting Entitlements to Fix Budget, WASH. POST, Mar. 29, 1997, at A4.
100. See Glen 0. Robinson, Public Choice Speculations on the Item Veto, 14 VA. L.
REV. 403 (1988). Making a similar point in a far more entertaining way, see Dave Barry,
Backlight, WASH. POST, Mar. 9, 1997, (Magazine), at W5 (explaining why members of
Congress interested in reelection cannot cut social security benefits).
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The Item Veto Act is a sensible response to these pressures.
Unlike constitutional reform proposals (item veto, balanced budget),
the Act does not prevent Congress from reasserting its formal
authority over the size and content of appropriations. Specifically,
while inconsistent with the constitutional separation of purse and
sword, the Item Veto Act is, in critical respects, nonbinding. Congress, for example, could nullify the Act's application simply by
prefacing future appropriations with the clause "Notwithstanding
any provision of the Line Item Veto Act of 1996."101 With that
said, unlike expedited recision proposals (that require congressional
approval of presidential cancellations but compel Congress to approve or reject proposed cancellations within a specified period of
time), the Item Veto Act suggests that Congress is willing to
change the structural division of authority in order to rein in wasteful pork barrel spending.
The Item Veto Act has another advantage. By shifting significant cancellation authority to the President, Congress need not
make two types of hard choices. First, fears of a too powerful
appropriations committee pruning subcommittee priorities are staved
off by an inter-branch delegation.102 Second (and far more important), Congress need not eliminate constituency-driven programs in
order to meet deficit reduction targets. Instead, members can still
support programs that benefit politically powerful interest groups as
well as their home districts. 103 This is absolutely critical. Members appear impotent if they cannot deliver private goods legislation to their sponsors, interest groups and voters. As such, it is
imperative that members get their constituency-driven programs
approved by the requisite subcommittees, committees, and the
Congress. 104 By shifting the cancellation decision to the President,

101. Greg Sidak, in 1995 Senate testimony, made this point, noting that "commitments
made in bargaining situations influence behavior of other actors only to the extent that the
person making such commitments is credibly bound (by himself or others) to honoring
them. A statute and a constitutional amendment differ markedly in their likely efficacy in
protecting future generations." The Line Item Veto: A Constitutional Approach, Hearing
before the Constitution Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee, 104th Cong, 1st
Sess. 67 (1995) (statement of J. Gregory Sidak).
102. On member fears of omnibus appropriations elevating the status of appropriations
committee leadership, see Neal Devins, Appropriations Redux: A Critical Look at the
Fiscal Year 1988 Continuing Resolution, 1988 DUKE LJ. 389 (1988).
103. For an explication of the incentives members have to support private goods legislation, see Harold H. Bruff, Legislative Formality, Administrative Rationality, 63 TEx. L.
REv. 207 (1984).
104. See DAVID STOCKMAN, THE TRIUMPH OF PoLmcs: HOW THE REAGAN REVOLU-
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members can better accomplish this categorical imperative. In this
way, members of Congress are made better by asking the President
to do a certain amount of picking and choosing of budget priorities.1os
What then of the balance of powers? The Item Veto Act, while
suggesting that Congress is willing to trade off some of its power
of the purse when the responsible exercise of that power is too
costly, 106 is not a wholesale abdication of Congress' power of the
purse. As noted above, Congress can refuse to give effect to the
Act by formally waiving any or all of its provisions in subsequent
enactments. Admittedly, Congress may well be reluctant to take the
heat for such an obvious repudiation of the Act's laudatory deficit
reduction objectives.107 Nonetheless, Congress may limit cancellation authority by following some of the techniques that state lawmakers have used to limit the gubernatorial item veto.
Let me explain. 108 Unlike state constitutions that include specifications for the style and format of appropriations bills, Congress
may decide to appropriate in only large, lump sum amounts, eliminating from the bill specific projects and activities that the President hoped to veto. 109 Furthermore, although presidential cancellation authority extends to items detailed in committee reports, Congress can easily sidestep project-specific cancellations. By identifying program priorities in unofficial and informal documents (a
statement in the Congressional Record or a note on plain paper),
Congress can communicate its preferences to agencies. Since agen-

TION FAILED 390-94 (1986) (blaming the failure of the Reagan Revolution on an appropri-

ations process that revolves around subsidies and entitlements).
105. Thanks to Jerry Mashaw for this insight. Specifically, in a conversation we had
about the item veto, Mashaw described this process as a lottery whereby members, rather
than internalize the cost of budget cutting, would take their chances with the President.
106. Along these lines, when Congress enacted Gramm-Rudman in 1985, it ceded some
of its appropriations power for precisely this reason. See supra notes 41-48 and accompanying text.
107. It is also possible that the President will refuse to approve any measure that limits
Item Veto Act authority. Unless two-thirds of both houses of Congress overrode the veto,
Congress may have little recourse but to concede presidential cancellation authority.
108. Some of these examples come from Louis Fisher & Neal Devins, How Successfully
Can the States' Item Veto be Transferred to the President, 75 GEO. LJ. 175 (1986).
Others come from Fisher, supra note 93.
109. In fact, both Congress and the executive prefer lump sum funding to accommodate
the need for administrative discretion. Agency officials want the latitude and flexibility
associated with lump sum funding. Members of Congress also benefit from lump sum
appropriations because the only way to adjust statutory details to unexpected developments
is to pass another public law.
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cies are unlikely to risk retaliation in subsequent legislative cycles, 110 this informal mechanism will detail legislative preferences
as well as committee report specifications.
Congress can also bundle a number of disparate projects into a
single item. Just as the Constitution places no limit on what constitutes a bil1,111 there is no constitutional limitation on what constitutes an item. The Constitution, moreover, contains few limitations
on the spending power and is silent on the procedures Congress
was to adopt to authorize and appropriate funds. Today, Congress
may appropriate by tax, legislative and appropriations committees.
If Congress chose to do so, it could place substantive legislation in
appropriations bills and allow authorization committees to fund
programs directly through the use of "backdoor spending." These
matters are left exclusively to House and Senate rules, and to
Congress' interpretation and execution of its rules. 112
Congress' ability to blunt presidential cancellation authority, of
course, does not mean that Congress will, in fact, limit its delegation of budgetary power. After all, the very reasons why Congress
had incentive to transfer some of its appropriations power suggest
that Congress will be reluctant to limit presidential cancellation
authority. Moreover, by sending a message that the "President
knows best" when it comes to deficit reduction, Congress must
guard against the political fallout of end running the Item Veto
Act. In the end, Congress will only restrict its delegation when it
has the political will to do battle with the President. Congress'
power to set budget priorities is therefore contingent on its having
a sense of stake in either a particular appropriation or its power
vis-a-vis the President. With that said, as the next section will
show, battles of this sort will be infrequent, in part, because the
President may well make limited use of his newly acquired cancellation authority.
B. The Line Item Veto and the President
Line Item Veto Act supporters, noting that the President serves
a diffuse national-as opposed to local or regional-constituency,

110. See infra notes 141-42 and accompanying text (discussing agency compliance with
nonstatutory congressional action).
111. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
112. On the authorization-appropriation distinction, see generally Louis Fisher, The Authorization-Appropriation Process in Congress: Formal Rules and Informal Practices, 29
CATH. U. L. REv. 51 (1979).
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argue that the item veto enables the President to veto "private
good" pork, while preserving valuable "public good" features of
legislation. 113 This vision of the President as nonpartisan deficit
reduction czar misses the mark, however. State experiences with
the gubernatorial item veto and common sense suggest that the
President will use cancellation authority to advance his policy
agenda. Furthermore, discretionary federal spending is not a particularly rich ore for the President to mine in his efforts to limit
deficit spending. Mandatory spending, outside the direct control of
Congress, now accounts fo:r roughly sixty percent of the federal
budget. Beyond this inherent limitation on cancellation authority,
the President may well be cautious in asserting item veto authority
for political advantage. Congressional appropriations are often
backed by politically potent interests and, as a result, aggressive
use of the item veto may prove too costly. In other words, while
the item veto is more about expanding presidential prerogatives
than reducing the federal deficit, the President may gain little real
power through this mechanism.
State experiences with the gubernatorial power to eliminate or
reduce items in an appropriation have been unquestionably
mixed. 114 Although some evidence supports the notion that the
item veto can be a significant deficit reduction measure, 115 several

113. See Robinson, supra note 100; Stephen G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments
for the Unitary Executive, 48 ARK. L. REv. 23, 78-81 (1995). For a competing perspective, see Maxwell L. Steams, The Public Choice Case Against the Item Veto, 49 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 385 (1992).
114. The sweep of gubernatorial item veto authority varies from state to state. See THE
COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, THE BOOK OF THE STATES 113-14 (1988-89) (comparing state item veto provisions). In the context of this essay's discussion of state item veto
experiences, the phrase item veto refers to both gubernatorial item veto authority and
gubernatorial reduction authority.
115. The item veto has a reputation for saving money. A 1984 legislative analysis prepared by the American Enterprise Institute concluded that "governors have vetoed or reduced appropriations to achieve substantial savings." AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITIITE FOR
PUBLIC POUCY REsEARCH, PROPOSALS FOR LINE-ITEM VETO AtJTHORITY 17 (1984), reprinted in Line Item Veto: Hearings on S. 43 Before the Senate Comm. on Rules and
Administration, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 153 (1985) [hereinafter Hearings on S. 43]. Specifically, this study pointed to Governor James Thompson of Illinois, who vetoed $174.7
million and used his item reduction powers to cut appropriations by an additional $26
million (about three percent of the appropriations), Governor George Deukmejian of California, who achieved savings of $1.2 billion (more than four percent of the state budget),
and Governor Richard Thornburgh of Pennsylvania, who used the item veto to reduce
spending by $1.15 billion (twelve percent of the budget). /d. at 18. Mark Crain and Jim
Miller's recent analysis is even more striking. By focusing on states that allow governors
to reduce items in appropriations, Miller and Crain conclude that an item-reduction veto
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studies call into question the item veto's effectiveness for reducing
expenditures. 116 Moreover, available evidence suggests that the
item veto often functions as a partisan political tool that causes
strife between the executive and legislative branches in state government.117 As Senator Mark Hatfield, Governor of Oregon from
1958-66, testified in 1984: "Legislators in states which have the
line-item veto routinely 'pad' their budgets. It is a wonderful way
for a Democratic-controlled legislature to put a Republican Governor on the spot: Let him be the one to line-item these issues that
were either politically popular, or very emotiona1." 118
Studies from Pennsylvania and Michigan support this conclusion.119 The Pennsylvania study suggested that "[w]hen a legislator, even though opposed in principle to an appropriation, is reasonably certain that the governor will slice it down to more moderate size, he is tempted to bolster himself politically by voting large
sums of money to a popular cause.'mo The Michigan study
claimed that the item veto at the state level encouraged legislators

cuts spending growth in half. See W. Mark Crain & James C. Miller ill, Budget Process
and Spending Growth, 31 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1021, 1045 (1990)); see also Ray L.
Brown, The Line Item Veto: How Well Does it Work?, 36 Gov'T Accrs. J. 19 (Winter
1987-88) (concluding that item reduction veto is an effective deficit reduction tool).
116. See Glenn Abney & Thomas P. Lauth, The Line-Item Veto in the States: An Instrument for Fiscal Restraint ·or an lnstrwnent for Partisanship?, 45 PUB. ADMIN. REv.
372, 374 (1985) (legislatures whose appropriations are subject to item veto are more "fiscally irresponsible"); James J. Gosling, Wisconsin Item-Veto Lessons, 46 PUB. ADMIN.
REv. 292, 298 (1986) (presidential "item veto will likely result in budget reductions,"
though the size of the reduction may not be great); see also Expedited Recision Authority
for the President, Hearing Before the Legislation and National Security Sub-committee of
the House Committee on Governmental Operations, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., at 129-141
(1993) (statement of Louis Fisher) (challenging veracity of 1992 GAO Report estimate
that item veto might well reduce the deficit by $70 billion over six years).
117. A 1988 regression analysis of the item veto and expenditure restraint did not fmd
"a single instance of a significant negative relationship between item veto powers and
government spending." David C. Nice, The Item Veto and Expenditure Restraint, 50:2 J.
POL. 487, 497 (1988). Indeed, according to Nice, "the few significant relationships were
in the wrong direction." ld. See also Abney & Lauth, supra note 116, at 375 (concluding
that use of item veto is influenced by political partisanship); Gosling, supra note 116, at
298 (concluding that Wisconsin experience suggests that the President may use the item
veto to control a Congress dominated by opposing political party).
118. Line-Item Veto: Hearings on SJ. Res. 26, SJ. Res. 178, and S. 1921 Before the
Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 98 Cong., 2d Sess.
21 (1984).
119. See Nelson McGeary, The Governor's Veto in Pennsylvania, 41 AM. POL. SCI.
REv. 941 (1947); JOHN A. PERKINS, THE ROLE OF TilE GOVERNOR OF MICHIGAN IN TilE
ENACTMENT OF APPROPRIATIONS, MICH. G0VT'L. Snro. No. 11 (1943).
120. McGeary, supra note 119, at 943.
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to please their constituents by voting for appropriations far in excess of anticipated revenues, thus forcing the governor to make the
inevitable reductions and incur the wrath of the interests adversely
affected. 121 In other words, the availability of an item veto allows
legislators to shift more of the responsibility for the fiscal process
to the executive} 22
The Item Veto Act likewise promises to spur on political conflict. Like his gubernatorial counterparts, the President will seek
political advantage through his use of cancellation authority. At the
least, because the decision of whether a program is subject to
cancellation lies with the President, programs favored by the President are not subject to cancellation}23 Relatedly, the President
may demand that members support programs that he favors to
secure his acquiescence to congressionally approved appropriations.124 In addition to allowing the President to preserve some
programs that are at least as wasteful as those canceled, ideology
and partisanship will also defme the exercise of presidential cancel-

121. See PERKINS, supra note 119, at 56 (citing A. MACDONALD, AMERICAN STATE
GoVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION 209-10 (1940)).
122. Available evidence suggests, moreover, that the item veto is used more frequently
as a political tool than a fiscal one. The 1986 Rules Committee study determined that the
item veto "remains first and foremost, a political instrument" See Nice, supra note 117.
A 1985 survey of budget officers in 45 states likewise concluded that the item veto is
used more to accomplish political aims than to reduce the budget A 1985 study comparing 28 states found that governors of states in which the legislature and governor were
from opposing parties were more likely to use the item veto. See Abney & Lauth, supra
note 116.
Studies of the item veto in selected states likewise support this conclusion. A 1986
Wisconsin study concluded that states use the item veto primarily as a tool of
policymaking and partisan politics. See Gosling, supra note 116. A 1985 review of lllinois
Governor James Thompson's use of the item veto argued that the veto triggered numerous
political battles. See Sevener, The Amentkltory Veto: To Be or Not To Be So Powerful?,
11 ILL. IssUES 14 (1985). Finally, a 1984 review by the House Budget Committee determined that "[t]he power of the line-item veto in states [such as California and Pennsylvania] has given rise to significant political strife which has, at times, threatenect the
shutdown of Government services and withholding of payments." STAFF OF HOUSE COMM.
ON THE BUDGET, THE LINE-ITEM VETO: AN APPRAISAL, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1984).
123. Correspondingly, the President is apt to favor programs in states which support
either him or members of his party at the expense of states that offer little political advantage to the President and his allies.
124. See Fisher & Devins, supra note 108 at 189-91 (discussing ways in which the
President and Congress may horsetrade over favored appropriations). See also Hearings on
S. 43, supra note 115, at 117 (statement of Milton J. Socolar) (concluding that item veto
and cancellation proposals "cannot be expected" to reduce the deficit and, therefore,
"should be viewed in the context of their effect on the relative balance of powers.").
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lation authority. As such, conflicts between the branches-as the
states' experiences reveal-are likely to arise. 125
The exercise of cancellation power, however, is not necessarily
a boon to the presidency. In particular, the President may well find
himself in a Catch-22. On the one hand, rather than take a political
beating for failing to reduce the size of the national debt, the President may feel obligated to exercise cancellation authority. On the
other hand, the exercise of cancellation authority may prove politically costly. Congress, like state lawmakers, may approve costly
but politically popular initiatives and thereby invite cancellations
that might damage the presidency.126 In other words, the Item Veto Act may "actually undermine the President's reputation, his
ability to resolve conflicts and, ultimately, his political
strength." 127
Another (and more probable) outcome is that presidential cancellation authority will not matter that much after all. Unlike governors who are often bound by balanced budget obligations, the
President may limit his cancellations to highly visible and politically vulnerable items. For example, when Presidents identify the
types of items they will cancel, prime candidates are silly sounding
but not particularly costly items. Accordingly, Presidents may
"speak loudly but carry a small stick," that is, they may make
much of the accounts they cancel but may not cancel all that
much.128 In this way, Presidents do not suffer the costs of cancel125. This conflict may well result in substantial delays in the enactment of appropriations bills and uncertainty on the part of agencies, state governments, and private citizens
regarding their funding levels.
126. See supra notes 119-22 and accompanying text; see also FISHER, supra note 93, at
3-4 (discussing ways in which state lawmakers use the item veto to punish governors);
The Balanced Budget Amendment-Volume 2, Hearings Before the House Committee on
the Budget, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1992) (Statement of Rep. David Obey) (stating that
Congress should consider "giv[ing] back the President impoundment authority, lock, stock
and barrel. I think that would scare the hell out of the White House, because right now
the White House . . . escape[s] all responsibility").
127. Michael A. Fitts, The Paradox of Power in the Modern State: Why a Unitary,
Centralized, Presidency May Not Exhibit Effective or Legitimate Leadership, 144 U. PA.
L. REv. 827, 835 (1996). For this reason, George Bush's highly publicized refusal to
exercise inherent item veto authority may well have been a by-product of the President's
fear that he no longer would be able to blame Congress for skyrocketing deficits. See J.
Gregory Sidak & Thomas A. Smith, Why Did President Bush Repudiate the "Inherent"
Line·ltem Veto?, 9 J. L. & POL. 39 (1992).
128. For example, from 1981-1992, only two domestic programs of significance wcre
terminated by the White House and Congress. See Lawrence Haas, Never Say Die, 24
NAT'L J. 755, 756 (March 28, 1992). More strikingly, while President Bush proposed to
terminate 246 programs in fiscal year 1993, only $5 billion of a $350 billion deficit
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ing politically popular programs while reaping the benefits of a
demonstrable commitment to cutting government waste. 129
The likely limits of presidential cancellation authority are best
revealed in a list that President Reagan submitted to Congress of
"wasteful, unnecessary, or low priority spending projects" in the
fiscal year 1988 continuing resolution. 130 The continuing resolution contained $604 billion in budget authority; the Reagan list of
projects that could have been excised with an item veto contained
$970 million. 131 Moreover, with respect to presidential rescissions,
the Reagan administration proposed $43.3 billion during its tenure.132 Savings of $970 million in one year or even $43 billion
over eight years simply do not dent a $150 billion annual deficit.
Indeed, the President's 1985 Economic Report proclaimed bluntly
that the item veto "may not have a substantial effect on total Federal expenditure," but may be used by the President "to change the
composition of Federal expenditure-from activities preferred by
the Congress to activities preferred by the President."133
Preexisting budgetary demands also suggest that presidential
cancellation authority is more about the balance of powers than
deficit reduction. Sixty percent of the budget is nondiscretionary
and therefore is not even covered by annual appropriations.
Entitlements such as social security and medicare as well as interest on the national debt are handled by permanent appropriations

would have been reduced through those program cuts. See id.
129. With respect to the Item Veto Act, this conclusion is buttressed by the fact that
canceled appropriations cannot be transferred to programs favored by the President. As a
result, other than make a minuscule impact on a $5.3 trillion (and still rising) national
debt, the President gains very little by canceling appropriated funds. In contrast, whenever
the President exercises his cancellation authority he bears the costs of disappointing the
expectation interests of program beneficiaries as well as some members of Congress.
130. H.R. Doc. No. 174, tOOth Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1988).
131. See Hearings on SJ. Res. 9, SJ. Res. 23 and SJ. Res. 31, supra note 5 (submitted statement of Louis Fisher of the Congressional Research Service).
132. See V. MCMURTRY, REsCISSIONS BY TilE PREsiDENT SINCE 1974: BACKGROUND
AND PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE 10 (Cong. Res. Serv. 1989).
133. This conclusion applies with equal force to the Bush and Clinton administrations.
Witness the tug of war between President Bush and Congress over 1992 rescissions.
While agreeing on the total amount of rescissions, the Congress and White House fought
a pitched battle over whose preferred programs would be cut. In the end, a compromise
was reached that merged legislative and executive preferences. See Vivica Novack, Defective Remedy, 25 Nat'l J. 749 (1993). Along the same lines, President Clinton and the
Republican Congress fought over the content of fiscal year 1995 rescissions. The President
preferred Democratic social initiatives; the Congress preferred courthouse and highway projects. See Andrew Taylor, Spending Powers: Clinton Criticizes Republicans for Line-Item
Veto Delay, 53 CONG. Q. WKLY. RPr. 1627 (1995).

1634

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:1605

and therefore are within the jurisdiction of the tax committees.
Entitlements, moreover, are controlled by changing substantive law
(for example, eligibility and level of benefits) rather than through
the appropriations process. Finally, although technically subject to
veto or rescission, appropriations that further presidential priorities
are effectively veto-proof. For example, in light of President
Reagan's commitment to maintaining defense spending, enhanced
rescission authority or an item veto in the hands of the Reagan
administration would have applied at best to less than fifteen percent of the budget. 134
Presidential cancellation authority offers little hope of fiscal
salvation. Its impact, if any, will be felt in Congress-White House
relations. With that said, the ways in which the Item Veto Act will
affect the dance that takes place between Congress and the President over budget priorities is indeterminate. Will the President use
this new power to aggressively advance his budget priorities? Will
presidential cancellation prove little more than symbolic measures
that neither advance the President's agenda nor reduce the deficit?
Will Congress force the President to choose between either canceling politically popular programs or allowing the national debt to
continue its steady rise? The answer to these and other questions
will be decided by political will, not structural divisions of authority. As the next section will detail, the triumph of politics over
structure is quite typical in the resolution of conflicts between
Congress and the White House
C. Political Will and the Balance of Powers

Formal divisions of authority between the branches, whether an
outgrowth of statutory delegations or constitutional design, inform
but do not defme Congress-White House relations. 135 Indeed, formal power sharing arrangements play, at best, a marginal role in
resolving conflicts between Congress and the President. These
conflicts, instead, are typically resolved through informal negotiation. While formal divisions of authority lurk in the background of
these disputes, base political concerns often are at the fore of these
conflicts. For example, the President's exercise of cancellation
authority is largely dependent on his political popularity, his will-

134. See Fisher & Devins, supra note 108, at 189; Hearings on S. 43, supra note 115,
at 171.
135. For an explication of why structural arrangements do not define interbranch relations, see Fitts, supra note 9.
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ingness to make deficit reduction a centerpiece. of his policy agenda, and whether Congress is controlled by his political party. This
conclusion hardly qualifies as rocket science. Nevertheless, the
sugge~tion that presidential cancellation authority is indeterminate is
reenforced by an examination of other topics that likewise show
that pressures outside of the constitutional specification of powers
defme the ways the branches communicate with each other. This
section will do just that, considering congressional-executive information access disputes and the legislative veto. 136
To begin with, Congress and the Executive have strong incentives to work with each other. For Congress, broadly worded statutes that set forth generalized objectives, but are silent on the
details of administration, are far easier to enact than highly detailed
legislation that specifies the distribution of benefits and burdens.
Making use of public choice theory, Harold Bruff has explained
this phenomenon: "Selecting a decision rule requires a prospective-and necessarily rough-judgment about which rule will produce the lowest sum of two kinds of costs: the decision costs of
obtaining assent from the requisite number of participants and the
external costs of decisions that disfavor a given participant."137 At
the same time, while Congress prefers to lower its decision costs
by delegating power, Congress conditions that delegation on its
ability to protect its institutional priorities "at the operational stage
[when] it is much easier to predict the winners and losers from a
change in the decision rules."138 For this reason, Congress has a
strong incentive to couch its delegation with mechanisms that enable it to "veto" administrative decisions that it disapproves of
without enacting legislation. Likewise, Congress has strong incen-

136. Another example is War Powers. Specifically, although the Constitution envisions a
significant legislative role in military policymaking, Presidential priorities tend to dominate
War Powers decision making. See generally LoUIS FISHER, PREsiDENTIAL WAR POWER
(1995); Louis Fisher, Sidestepping Congress: Presidents Acting Under the UN and NATO,
47 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 1237 (1997). The reason for this is that "decisions about such
matters as troop commitments and the conduct of negotiation are so much more central to
executive interests than to those of the judiciary or Congress." John 0. McGinnis, Consti-

tutional Review by the Executive in Foreign Affairs and War Powers: A Consequence of
Rational Choice in the Separation of Powers, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 293, 294
(1993). In other words, "the interests and capacities of the branches," rather than formal
divisions of authority, often define which branch of government will exercise authority. /d.
See also John 0. McGinnis, The Spontaneous Order of War Powers, 41 CASE W. REs.
L. REV 1317 (1997); Fitts, supra note 9.
137. Bruff, supra note 103, at 218.
138. /d. at 221.
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tives to insist that the Executive share with it information necessary
to monitor the administration of federal programs.
The Executive also benefits from these power-sharing arrangements. Witness the White House's participation in the establishment
and the growth of the legislative veto, a procedure by which departments or agencies would make proposals that would become
law unless Congress rejected them by a majority vote of either one
or both house of Congress. Originally proposed by Herbert Hoover
in 1929, the legislative veto enabled Hoover to "make law" and
reorganize executive branch operations without subjecting his plan
to the cumbersome and uncertain lawmaking process. 139 Over
time, the legislative veto grew in popularity but became more
controversial. Perceiving that CoJ!gress was using this procedure to
micromanage its operations, the Reagan administration-while
willing to accept the legislative veto as a condition on its discretion by signing onto statutes containing legislative vetoes-successfully challenged the procedure's constitutionality in
INS v. Chadha. 140
Chadha, rather than suggesting that courts are likely to play a
large role in resolving disputes between Congress and the White
House over the line that separates lawmaking from administration,
spoke to the forces that propel the legislative and executive branches to resolve informally their institutional disputes with one another. In the decade after Chadha, 1983-1993, well over two hundred
legislative vetoes were enacted into law. Although presidential
signing statements sometimes cite Chadha and proclaim that these
measures will be treated "as having no legal force or effect," 141 it
is quite clear that affected agencies comply with legislative veto
provisions. "Agencies cannot risk . . . collisions with the committees that authorize their programs and provide funds." 142 As Louis
Fisher observed in his defmitive study of this device, "In one form
or another, legislative vetoes will remain an important mechanism
for reconciling legislative and executive interests." 143 In fact, Fish-

139. See generally Louis Fisher, The Legislative Veto: Invalidated, It Survives, 56 LAW
& CONIEMP. PROBS. 273 (1993).
140. 462 u.s. 919 (1983).
141. WILLIAM FRENCH SMITII, LAW AND JUSTICE IN THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION:
THE MEMOIRS OF AN ATTORNEY GENERAL 221 (1991).
142. Fisher, supra note 139, at 288.
143. /d. at 292.
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er argued, "[n]either Congress nor the executive branch wanted the
static model of government offered by the Court." 144
Information access disputes tell a nearly identical story. In
particular, the executive sees little to be gained from fighting emotionally pitched battles over whether information access is necessary for Congress to perform its legislative duties or, alternatively,
whether information access requests improperly intrude upon the
executive's duty to administer governmental programs. 145 Executive compliance, however, does not mean that the executive is convinced of the appropriateness of the information access request.
Instead, Congress' success is often a byproduct of the numerous
weapons in its arsenal that can be used to punish recalcitrant executive branch officials. Congress, among other things, may publicly
embarrass executive branch officials, hold up confnmation hearings
of presidential nominees, and enact legislation that restricts agency
operations.
These congressional powers are potent. For example, executive
branch officials have no interest in seeing the newspaper headline
"Congress Subpoenas Documents,"146 nor do they want to be publicly humiliated before an acrimonious legislative hearing. When an
agency official is called to testify, committee members are put in a
position of some strength over that individual. If a dispute over
· information access is going on at the time, the hearing is the
committee's chance to put a great deal of political and personal
pressure on the witness. The success of this technique has been
attested to by committee staffers. The former general counsel to the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Britt Snider, commented
that "the intelligence agencies withhold such information . . . at
their own peril. I have found the prospect of being criticized by
the Committees to be a very compelling motivation for most agencies...." 147 Along the same lines, agencies seem particularly
willing to work with Congress when the nomination of a high-

144. /d.
145. For general treatments of this issue, see Nelson Lund, Lawyers and the Defense of
the Presidency, 1995 B.Y.U. L. REV. 17 (1995); Peter M. Shane, Negotiating for Knowledge: Administrative Responses to Congressional Demands for Information, 44 ADMIN. L.
REv. 197 (1992); Neal Devins, Congressional-Executive Information Access Disputes: A
Modest Proposal-Do Nothing, 48 ADMIN. L. REv. 109 (1996).
146. Telephone Interview with Linda Gustitus, Staff Director and Chief Counsel, Senate
Oversight Subcomm. of Government Management (Mar. 25, 1994).
147. Letter from L. Britt Snider, General Counsel to the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence to Peter M. Shane (July 10, 1990) (on file with author).

1638

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:1605

ranking agency official is held up, pending executive branch compliance with oversight requests. This is precisely what occurred
with Clinton's choice for head of the Justice Department's Environment Section, Lois Schiffer, during Congress' investigation of
environmental crimes enforcement.
The question of whether executive branch interests are served
through such regularized compliance remains. The answer is a
qualified yes. At the agency and departmental level, it is critically
important to maintain good relations with legislative overseers.
Consequently, it is rarely sensible to place abstract principles of
separation of powers ahead of day-to-day working relationships. 148
As was the case with the legislative veto, Congress needs to delegate in order to reduce the costs of legislation; the Executive needs
to accept conditions on delegated authority in order to facilitate
Congress' willingness to transfer power through delegations. "Each
branch is both a potential ally and adversary of the others, and is
thus involved in ... a 'bargaining' or 'mixed motive' game in
which there is a mixture of mutual dependence and conflict, of
partnership and competition."149 These bargains, rather than formal divisions of authority, defme power sharing among the branches.
ill. CONCLUSION: SPECULATIONS ON TilE
BALANCED BUDGEf AMENDMENT

"[T]he way we design our political institutions reveals much
about how we wish to resolve our underlying value conflicts in
society and which goals we embrace over time."150 Without question, concerns of Congress' inability to control a deficit run amok
figured prominently in the Item Veto Act's delegation of cancellation authority to the President. It is equally true, however, that the

148. Under the current regime, the threshold determination of whether an information
request raises a "substantial claim of executive privilege" rests with those who have the
least interest in asserting an executive privilege claim against congressional overseers: the
department and agency heads. 13 OP. OFF. LEGAL COUNSEL 185 (1989). While presidential and Justice Department materials provide guidance as to what types of legislative
requests are problematic, id., there is little reason to think that agency heads will place
these values ahead of maintaining good day-to-day relations with their congressional
overseers.
149. McGinnis, Constitutional Review, supra note 136, at 299.
150. Michael Fitts, Ways to Think About the Unitary Executive: A Comment on Approaches to Government Structure, 15 CARDozo L. REv. 323, 336 (1993); see also
Lessig, supra note 14.
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Item Veto Act is a bit of an empty shell, the contents of which
will be filled through political gamesmanship. Although specifying
that presidential cancellations reduce the federal budget deficit
without harming the national interest, 151 the Act neither requires
presidential action nor limits legislative-executive horsetrading that
may increase the national debt. 152 That is, if Congress is truly
committed to either reducing deficits or (heaven forbid) balancing
the budget, it needs to do more than authorize presidential cancellations.
On this score, the failure of Congress and the President to rally
behind the Balanced Budget Amendment is revealing. 153 While
filled with loopholes, 154 the Balanced Budget Amendment is consequential in ways that the Item Veto Act is not. Most strikingly,
"[t]he President would be duty bound to impound funds ... and
perhaps obligated to defend those programs of which he disapproves."155
The President, for good reason, sees little political advantage in
this potentially massive transfer of power. Unlike the Item Veto
Act, where the President can both increase debt through
horsetrading and limit his cancellations to programs which lack a
meaningful political base, an enforceable Balanced Budget Amendment may well force the President to upset settled expectations by
defunding entitlements and the like.156 Rather than commit politi-

151. This specification may well satisfy the constitutional standard governing legislative
delegations of policymaking, that is, an "intelligible principle" that sets decipherable
boundaries. This standard is set forth in Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally, 337 F.
Supp. 737 (D.D.C. 1971) and Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989). For
this reason, I think the disnict court's invocation of Chadha to strike down the Line Item
Veto Act was misplaced. See supra note 8.
152. For example, nothing in the Act prevents the President from conditioning his approval of an item on Congress' funding one of his pet projects.
153. See Eric Pianin & Helen Dewar, Budget Amendment Barely Loses in Senate,
WASH. POST, Mar. 5, 1997, at AI.
154. See The Balanced Budget Amendment, Hearings Before the House Committee on
the Budget, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 189-197 (1992) (statement by Louis Fisher) [hereinafter
102d Congress Hearings); see also Devins, supra note 17, at 75-82 (discussing ways in
which lawmakers can skirt the amendment's deficit reduction goals).
155. Balanced Budget Amendment, Hearings Concerning HJ. Res. I before the House
Judiciary Committee, 105th Cong., 1st. Sess. (1997) (statement of Cass R. Sunstein); see
also 1994 Senate Appropriations Committee Hearing at 82 (statement of Charles Fried)
(stating that the President could "argue with considerable plausibility" that he has a "duty"
to impound). Not surprisingly, governors are more prone to use their item veto authority
in states with balanced budget amendments. See 102d Congress Hearings, supra note 154
(statement of Louis Fisher).
156. Whether Congress would craft an enforceable Balanced Budget Amendment, of
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cal suicide on a regular basis, the President would much prefer to
embrace optimistic economic forecasts ~d put off hard budgetary
choices until after the next election. 157
The Congress too has good reason to steer clear of a meaningful balanced budget amendment. 158 This fundamental change in
the structure of government, while imposing significant political
costs on the President, does not allow Congress to protect its interests through horsetrading and other techniques. That the amendment
scores well with focus group participants is inadequate compensation for this wholesale transfer of budgetary power. 159 Put another
way, there is little political gain in compulsory presidential impoundments of congressionally favored programs.
Absent fundamental change affecting either the way we elect
public officials or their terms of office, it is unlikely that elected
officials will impose the costs of a balanced budget (through severe
program cuts or substantial tax increases) on the present generation.160 Elected officials have little incentive to balance the budget. Hearings are filled with witnesses who benefit from congressional spending. Since the costs of spending are typically spread
throughout the nation, few witnesses oppose spending. A 1990
study by James Payne found a 145 to 1 ratio of witnesses supporting proposed spending. 161 While the incentives for spending are
strong, there is no incentive to fmance increased spending through
tax hikes. Elected officials (who want to stay elected), therefore,
"'enjoy' appropriating money to benefit their constituents, but they
do not 'enjoy' taxing them."162 Former chair of the House Budget
course, is another matter altogether.
157. See Clay Chandler & Eric Pianin, A Strategy to Delay the Pain, WASH. POST, Feb.
7, 1997, at AI; Clay Chandler and Eric Pianin, President Won't Back CPI Panel, WASH.
PoST., March 13, 1997, at Al. For this reason, as Mike Fitts sagely observed: "[T]he
individuality, centrality, and visibility of the "personal unitary president," which is seen as
an advantage in terms of collective choice and public debate, can be a disadvantage when
it comes to conflict resolution and public assessment." Fitts, supra note 127, at 835.
158. Congress, however may pursue a Balanced Budget Amendment with gimmicks and
loopholes. Such action would enable Congress to duck responsibility while appearing to
act decisively. It also would reenforce the trend of Congress' divesting itself of some
formal power in the name of reducing annual deficits.
159. See Editorial, Constitutional Boondoggle, WAU.. ST. J., Feb. 4, 1997, at AI8.
160. Don Elliot endorses the convening of a Constitutional Convention to examine such
far reaching reform. See E. Donald Elliot, Constitutional Conventions and the Deficit,
1985 DUKE L. J. 1077, 1096-1110 (1985).
161. See James L. Payne, The Congressional Brainwashing Machine, 1990 PUBUC INTEREST 4 (1990). When this finding was reported to congressional staffers, their reaction
was surprise that the gap was not larger. See id.
162. Elliot, supra note 160, at 1091 (citing JAMES BUCHANAN & ROBERT WAGNER,
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Committee James R. Jones (D-Okla.) summed it up this way:
"There is a constituency for national defense. There is a constituency for every item of the domestic budget. There is a loud constituency for tax cuts. But there really is no constituency for a balanced budget."163 That future generations will bear the brunt of
this imbalance is a pill that most politicians are willing to swallow.164
Unless and until elected government is willing to risk significant political capital in the name of intergenerational equity, superficial reform measures-like Gramm-Rudman and the Item Veto
Act-will continue to rule the day. These initiatives, as this essay
has shown, offer little hope of tackling the national debt. Rather,
these measures do little more than shield political actors from
facing up to the consequences of their budgetary policy. 165
Proposals to mandate a balanced budget assume that the habits
and incentives of elected government will change. While some
change is possible, the cataclysmic change necessary to balance the
budget seems a pipe dream. Witness the Line Item Veto Act.
While far from inconsequential, the Act will not result in deficit
savings and will only marginally affect the balance of powers.
Congress and the White House, moreover, continue to oppose a
meaningful Balanced Budget Amendment because of the pain it
will inflict to politically potent constituencies. 166 Finally, tax increases and significant entitlement cuts remain taboo. None of this
is to suggest that government is uninterested in operating efficiently
or eliminating costly, ineffective programs. It is to suggest, however, that (nearly fifteen years after Gramm-Rudman) fundamental
budget reform is an idea whose time is yet to come. All of this, of
course, may change · in the not too distant. future. 167 With that

DEMOCRACY IN DEFICIT: POLmCAL LEGACY OF LoRD KEYNES 93-94 (1977)).
163. Richard Snelling, The Deficit's Clear and Present Danger, N.Y. nMES, Mar. 3,
1985, (Magazine), at 48, 70.
164. See Elliot, supra note 160, at 1091-92 (discussing the works of public choice
theorists James Buchanan and Richard Wagner).
165. On this point, see Lessig, supra note 14; ROBERT BORK, EPILOGUE - THE DECLINE
OF PREsiDENTIAL POWER 58 ON PORK BARRELS AND PRINCIPLES (1988) ("[T)he political
and constitutional questions surrounding" the item veto makes clear that this proposal
"treat[s) symptoms rather than to cure causes."). Whether the national debt is a problem
that merits such fundamental change is another question altogether. With that said, the
hypocrisy of budget reform is highly problematic, for it dilutes the responsibility of government.
166. An item veto constitutional amendment would not present this problem.
167. For example, if the national debt continues its stratospheric rise, public pressure to
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said. especially after the reelection of Bill Clinton. there is reason
to think that the 1994 Republican takeover of Congress is not the
"constitutional moment.. that some thought it might be. 168 The
more things change. the more they stay the same.

"balance the budget" may eventually propel fundamental constitutional change.
168. For a speculative argument that the 1994 election might constitute such a "moment," see Mark Tushnet, Living in a Constitutional Moment, 46 CASE W. REs. L. REv.
845 (1996).

